alterations, these changes make permanent the estate tax law that was in effect for [2011] [2012] . Although the passage of the recent estate tax law may appear to put the issue to rest, we believe the debate is not over and that studying the impact of estate tax and other alternative approaches to taxing wealth at death is still important. In particular, there remains a persistent, and as yet unresolved, debate regarding the fairness and efficacy of this tax. On one side, there is the argument that the estate tax amounts to double taxation and as a result may be inherently unfair. On the other hand, in the absence of any wealth transfer tax, there is scope for households to avoid taxation on any unrealized capital gains through inter-generational transfers. Given the concentration of capital among high wealth households, failure to tax capital income and wealth transferred across generations also raises questions of fairness, as it could substantially alter the progressivity of the tax schedule. Moreover, discrepancies between capital gains and wealth transfer taxes may distort capital transfer decisions, raising concerns of a potential for dead-weight loss.
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In this paper, we explore the importance of unrealized capital gains (untaxed income) in bequeathed estates over the next decade. Connecting this to the larger debate, we investigate how different approaches to taxing wealth at death affect the distribution of the tax burden across households as well as the revenue generated by the tax. To this end we compare scenarios in which the entire estate is taxed to scenarios in which only unrealized capital gains face any tax. Specifically, we compare the current estate tax law to two scenarios for applying a capital gains tax at death. In the first scenario all unrealized capital gains above an exemption level in the estate are taxed at death. In the second scenario all unrealized capital gains are taxed at death regardless of the size of the overall estate.
For this analysis, we develop an empirical model of wealth accumulation using household survey data that forecasts the wealth distribution of U.S. households over the next decade. We combine this with data on individual mortality from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Society of Actuaries to calculate estimates of the distribution of gross estates in each year. Using data from the Statistics of Income (SOI) division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), we estimate how gross estates are likely to be apportioned at death and the subsequent tax liabilities under the various tax rules. Previous models of wealth accumulation used in this context have been estimated using aggregated data and/or imputed measures of wealth.
3 Our methodology differs from that of previous work in that it uses household-level micro data on measured household wealth. Specifically, we use the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
Because we estimate the evolution of the wealth distribution using household level data, we can infer, under certain assumptions, decedents' demographics as well as the likely composition of their wealth at the time of death. Most importantly, because the SCF collects information on unrealized capital gains, we can forecast the likely effects of a capital gains tax at death. Going beyond previous work that has focused mainly on aggregate revenue forecasts, we look at how these different tax regimes change the proportion of households subject to any tax, average tax payments, and the distribution of taxes paid across various demographic categories.
Our estimates indicate that if capital gains are realized at death, other estate taxes are eliminated, and there is no capital gains tax allowance or exemption, the amount of tax revenue generated between 2013 and 2023 is $694 billion. This is significantly higher than the $438 billion in revenue we estimate would be generated under the current estate tax law. However, we estimate that about 37 percent of all deceased households would have to pay at least some tax, as compared to fewer than 1 percent of deceased households under the current estate tax law. Consequently, replacing the estate tax with a pure capital gains tax, without an allowance, would represent a fundamental shift in the notion of who should pay taxes on intergenerational wealth transfers. Adding a capital gains allowance reduces the revenue from the capital gains tax scenario to an estimated $249 billion for the period 2013-2023. 5 Moreover, the allowance sharply shifts the tax burden toward high wealth households. In this scenario 92 percent of the tax is paid by the top 1 percent of wealth holders, an increase of 10 percentage points over the current estate tax law, and a still larger increase over the no capital gains allowance scenario. Overall, we estimate that both capital gains tax scenarios would reduce the mean tax liability of estates subject to tax. However, overall revenues and the concentration of the tax among the highest wealth holders depend crucially on the size of the allowance (or exemption).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II contextualizes our contribution within the larger literature on estate taxation. Section III discusses the recent changes to the estate tax law and describes the alternative regimes we consider. Section IV presents the data and details our empirical methodology. Results of our estimation of various scenarios are presented in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II. relevant lIterature
There has been a substantial amount of academic research on the economic effects of the estate tax.
6 Most relevant to this paper is work investigating the relationship between the estate and capital gains taxes. However, our work also relates to two other strands of the literature. The first of these has sought to build predictive empirical models that produce estimates of future revenue generated by the existing and proposed estate tax 5 Our capital gains allowance is based on the estate tax rules for 2010, during which households could treat death as sale and pay tax on unrealized gains. See Section III for details. 6 Some of the issues include the effects of the estate tax on consumption and savings, entrepreneurship, charitable contributions, bequest behavior, and capital gains realizations. For a thorough overview of these issues see Gale, Hines and Slemrod (2001), Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) , and Kopczuk (2012) .
laws. The second has studied the potential distributive impact of estate tax liabilities across households. The tax code allows an individual to avoid paying tax on capital gains by holding assets until death. This may make individuals less likely to sell some assets (such as businesses) during their lifetime (the lock-in effect) and prevent the desirable transfer of assets to more productive owners. When appreciated assets are passed on to heirs, their tax basis is set at the value at death (step-up of basis). Consequently, taxes on the gains prior to death are eliminated. An estate tax can work to partially offset the lock-in effect and provide a backstop against gains escaping taxation by taxing the full value of the asset, including the cost basis, at death. Nevertheless, an estate tax that is separate from a capital gains tax raises two general concerns. First, an estate tax that considers current wealth in its entirety potentially taxes some portion of wealth that had been taxed previously, a feature that may be perceived as unfair. Second, any difference between estate tax and capital gains rates can further distort household decisions regarding when to realize gains from capital. 7 To date, there has been relatively little empirical work done on these issues. However, Auten and Joulfaian (2001) document a positive elasticity between capital gains realizations and the estate tax rate. They find that a 1 percent increase in the tax rate increases realizations prior to death by 0.36 percent. This suggests that a low estate tax rate exacerbates the lock-in effect, and that large differentials between the capital gains and estate tax rates may result in substantial distortions.
Our work in this paper most resembles Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) , which looks at the impact on tax liabilities and potential revenues from replacing the estate tax with a capital gains tax at death. Using data from the 1998 SCF, they estimate estate tax and capital gains tax liabilities for households predicted to die in the next year. They find that a capital gains tax imposed at death raises less total revenue than the estate tax. Households with estates under $1 million would pay more under a capital gains tax, while households with larger estates would be more likely to experience a substantial reduction in tax liability under a capital gains tax. Our analysis here extends theirs by modeling wealth dynamics over a longer time horizon and comparing the effects on a broad set of demographic groups across a wider range of alternative tax scenarios.
Estimates of prospective estate tax revenues have been produced by several institutions dedicated to informing researchers and policy makers on issues related to this tax. The most important of these are the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and The Tax Policy Center (TPC).
8 CBO estimates (McNamee, 2009; Elmendorf, 2011) are derived from a model that uses data on estate tax filings combined with estimated rates of return on assets to predict aggregate future wealth flows. As this macro-based methodology is designed to predict only aggregate revenues, it cannot produce household level liabilities or differentiate between realized and unrealized portions of household wealth. In contrast to the CBO model, Tax Policy Center (TPC) estimates (TPC, 2011) are derived using individual income tax data combined with wealth estimates that are imputed from the SCF. Since the model is derived mainly from tax data, which are rich in financial variables but poor in demographic detail, there is little scope for studying how predicted liabilities may vary across demographic groups. Much like with the CBO models, these cannot differentiate between types of wealth, and thus can only consider a limited set of potential tax regimes. Lastly, SOI, as the statistical branch of the IRS, is a key source for the actual data on estate tax filings. SOI also provides some projections on estate tax filing, but their main focus is on the actual data from filings (IRS, 2000 (IRS, -2011 . Work investigating the distribution of estate tax liabilities has been largely limited to looking at how liabilities are distributed across various income groups or types of income (adjusted gross income, cash income, etc.). Similar to the work on revenue prediction, these studies are almost all based on actual tax data. Consequently they are constrained by the limited number of demographic variables available, making some measure of income a natural choice. Still, some work using tax data has been able to estimate the burden on business owners given their special status in the estate tax debate (Gravelle and Maguire, 2008; Marples and Gravelle, 2009; Burman, Lim, and Rohaly, 2008; Congressional Budget Office, 2005) . Because our model is built directly using survey data on household wealth, we can, in addition to these limited demographic groups, examine how the tax burden is distributed by wealth, age, education, race, and marital status.
Finally, there has also been a fairly large amount of academic research on the general equilibrium effects of the estate tax on consumption and savings. In a good summary of the issues, Gale and Perozek (2001) argue that the effects are dependent on the motives for leaving a bequest to heirs. If the motive is altruistic (similar to the joy-of-giving motive, where individuals leave bequests because they simply enjoy it), then the effect of the estate tax on the decedent is ambiguous due to income and substitution effects; however, heirs are likely to increase savings resulting from the reduction in their inheritance due to the estate tax. When bequests are accidental then the estate tax has no effect on the savings and consumption of decedents, but since the windfall to heirs (and therefore, the expected value of their inheritance) is reduced by the estate tax, this tends to reduce their consumption and increase savings. Under the exchange motive, parents promise a bequest in return for services (visits, helping out when sick, etc.) from their children. The effect of the estate tax on the parents depends on their demand for services and the availability of substitutes. If parents want to ensure they receive the services from their children, then they will save more to offset the cost of the estate tax, but if substitutes are available they may save less. The savings of the children is not affected by the estate tax, as the bequest is a payment for forgone wages or leisure. Unfortunately, the numerous empirical studies do not reveal a consensus on the effect of estate tax on saving and consumption.
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III. recent changes In estate taxatIon
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) began phasing out the U.S. federal estate tax by increasing the exemption amount and reducing the top marginal rate. Under EGTRRA, the exemption amount increased from $675,000 in 2001 to $3.5 million in 2009, with the top marginal rate falling from 55 to 45 percent. In 2010, it appeared the estate tax would be repealed, but the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 retroactively resurrected the estate tax and set an exemption limit of $5 million with a top marginal rate of 35 percent for 2010 through 2012. One aspect of the 2010 law was that filers had the option of filing under the estate tax law or under a modified carry-over basis rule for inherited property (similar to a capital gains tax).
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Under the 2010 act, the estate tax would have reverted back to the 2001 exemption level ($1 million) and top marginal rate (55 percent) in 2013 had the Congress not acted. However, in early 2013, in response to the "fiscal cliff," the Congress adopted estate tax rules similar to what applied during the 2011-2012 period -an exemption level of $5.12 million indexed for inflation and a top marginal rate of 40 percent. We use the estate tax law passed in 2013 as our "current estate tax law" scenario.
11
We compare the current (2013) estate tax with two scenarios based on replacing the estate tax with a capital gains tax imposed at death. These two capital gains counterfactuals differ by the amount of unrealized gains exempt from the tax. In the first, which we call the capital gains allowance (2010 CGA) scenario, the first $1.3 million of unrealized capital gain is exempt, with an additional $3 million exempt if there is a surviving spouse. This scenario is based on the estate tax rules for 2010, during which households could choose to treat capital gains as realized at death and pay tax on unrealized capital gains above $1.3 million or $4.3 million with a surviving spouse. 12 In the second, which we call the no capital gains allowance (no CGA) scenario, the exemption is zero and all unrealized capital gains are taxed. Current law exempts all households from paying any tax on the first $250,000 ($500,000 for couples filing jointly) in capital gains earned from the sale of their primary home. As a result, we exclude all capital gains from 9 See Gale, Hines, and Slemrod (2001) , , Joulfaian (2006) , and Marples and Gravelle (2009) There was a provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to switch to carry-over basis, but that part of the law was repealed before it was ever put into action. 11 See Jacobson, Raub, and Johnson (2007) for a history of the estate tax. 12 The exemption amounts are based on 2010 IRS Form 8939, Allocation of Increase in Basis for Property Acquired from a Decedent.
decedents' primary homes in the analysis. 13 All remaining unrealized capital gains are taxed at a 23.8 percent rate, which includes the maximum long-term capital gains rate of 20 percent plus the additional 3.8 percent unearned income Medicare contribution tax.
We first explore the estate tax and capital gains scenarios independently for our full sample of households. We then investigate how the estate tax paying population might have fared under a capital gains tax at death. More specifically, we allow wealth and apportionment to evolve as though households faced the current estate tax and then, for each bequeathed estate subject to the tax, we calculate what this household would have paid in each of our capital gains counterfactuals. Holding this estate tax payer population constant allows us to directly examine how bequeathed estates' liabilities compare across these different tax regimes.
Iv. empIrIcal approach
Our empirical approach can be briefly summarized as follows. We start with data on a (weighted) representative sample of households in 2007 that includes detailed self-reported information on the composition of households' wealth holdings. The data also include sampling weights that we use to project the sample to the U.S. population. We age this sample year-by-year until 2022, generating estates probabilistically using separate mortality tables and model-based estimates of future wealth. For each future generated estate we apply tax rules reflecting our different scenarios. We separate each estate into taxes, expenses, charitable bequests, and family bequests. In addition, for those households initially consisting of a married couple, we apportion part of the estate to the surviving spouse. The specific details of our approach are described in the following two subsections.
a. data
Data for this study are taken from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
14 This is the ninth in a series of recent triennial surveys of household wealth conducted by the Federal Reserve Board. The SCF was selected for several reasons. First, although many other national surveys have collected wealth data, the SCF is specifically designed for this purpose. Particular attention has been paid toward soliciting detailed information on all components of wealth, including unrealized capital gains. Secondly, evidence suggests that household wealth is highly concentrated, even more so than income. Consequently, the SCF attempts to provide an accurate representation of the entire wealth distribution by using a dual sampling frame. For the 2007 survey, 2,915 families were 13 In the analysis we only consider capital gains on (1) secondary properties, (2) businesses, and (3) financial assets held by decedents. It is possible that especially wealthy decedents enjoy gains on the sale of their primary homes that exceed the exemption. Not including these gains, however, significantly simplifies the analysis and does not alter the main results in the paper. 14 See Bucks et al. (2009) for a more extensive discussion of the survey. selected for inclusion by standard multi-stage area probability methods. Another 1,507 families were selected from tax files to over-sample wealthier families.
15 Data for the 2007 SCF were collected largely between May and December 2007. Detailed wealth and demographic information were collected for the primary families in each household, with summary information collection for any secondary families. 16 All statistics reported in this paper use design-based weights reflecting the dual sampling frame. The weight assigned to each sample household is its "blow-up" factor -that is, the number of U.S. households that it represents.
In the analysis, we distinguish between those more likely to pay an estate tax and those less likely to do so. The former we call the older wealthy sample. The older wealthy sample includes households in the top quintile of the wealth distribution with a household head aged 45 and older. 17 Descriptive statistics for demographic distributions in the 2007 SCF are given in Table 1 .
As shown in the table, in addition to being older and wealthier, households in the older wealthy sample are more likely to own a farm or other privately held business. They are less likely to be minorities, more likely to have a college degree, and more likely to be married. Finally, note that the analysis that follows is carried out using the entire SCF sample. However, as these groups are likely to differ in how they accumulate wealth, our model allows for wealth accumulation to vary across them.
B. estate Forecasting
The comprehensive forecasting of estates would necessarily involve the modeling of a complexity of economic and demographic dynamics, including behavioral responses to changes in tax policy, that go far beyond the scope of the present study. We use instead the simplest of micro-level, economic-demographic forecasting methods, dynamically modeling only wealth and death (Avery and Rendall, 2002) . Initially, the sample population is described by starting wealth, age, and marital status. Initial estate-eligible wealth includes all accounts, stocks, bonds, IRAs, cash-value life insurance, defined contribution retirement accounts, trusts, property, businesses, and vehicles. All debts are subtracted to arrive at net worth. 18 We model wealth changes as an annual percent 15 Avery, Elliehausen, and Kennickell (1988) present evidence suggesting that the dual frame provides much better coverage of total U.S. household wealth than conventional designs. Persons listed by Forbes magazine as being among the wealthiest 400 people in the United States are excluded from the sample. 16 Separate information was collected for financially independent relatives living with the primary family, referred to here as secondary families. In addition some elderly persons were living with children and other relatives and were reported as financially dependent. These persons were also treated as secondary families, but were assumed to have no wealth. 17 The top quintile consists of households with 2007 wealth of more than $462,000. We do not separately consider secondary households in our analysis as statistics show very few secondary households have any significant holdings. Inclusion of these households would be likely to have only a minimal impact the results of the analysis. 18 Missing from this measure of net worth are personal assets, such as furniture and jewellery, and defined benefit retirement funds (which are likely to have some estate value even if taken as an annuity). On the other hand, some assets such as businesses and vehicles probably have an overstated estate value. change depending on age, marital status, and age of retirement. 19 Death, including of one's spouse if married, is modeled probabilistically as depending only on age, year of death, race, and sex. The number of forecasted estates for the sample is then converted to a year-by-year population estimate by multiplying the probability of death in each year by the blow-up factor for each sample household. Rules about non-taxable bequests and expenses are used to convert wealth into estates and to produce year-byyear estimates of net estates, taxable estates, and subsequently estate taxes. Estimates both of the estate time series and of the distribution of eventual estates are produced. It should be noted that our methodology does not produce an estimate of the expected tax liability for a given household. Such an estimate would require taking account of the full distribution of changes in wealth over time for each household rather than just the expected wealth change. To be credible, estimation of such a model would require panel data, which we do not have. Instead, our approach produces an estimate of the distribution of expected estates and taxes across the population. In effect, we project the SCF cross-section forward in time, forecasting what a future cross-section of wealth, and hence estates and taxes, will look like.
In the one-and-a-half years that it took to process and clean the 2007 SCF, the shock of the Great Recession had hit the U.S. economy. We decided that the wealth depletion created by this shock was sufficiently large that we could not ignore it in the analysis. Consequently, we convert the 2007 wealth reported in the SCF to December 31, 2008 values. Housing, property, non-publicly traded business, and publicly traded equities were adjusted for each household. Housing and property values were adjusted using the Federal Housing Finance Agency weighted repeat-sales national index for residential housing, using the September 2007 to December 2008 change. Similarly the Wilshire 5000 equity index change over the same period was used to adjust business and equity values. All household individuals were aged one year and their birthday was assumed to be December 31. We assumed no one died between their interview in 2007 and the end of 2007. However, we applied the mortality tables described below to create estates in 2008. All persons dying during this year, and in subsequent years in the analysis, were assumed to die on December 31. 20 For each year after 2008, we used an estimated wealth change equation to model changes in wealth.
To estimate the wealth-change parameters, we split the SCF sample into three groups: (1) married couples; (2) widowed individuals; and (3) single individuals (separated, divorced, and never married). We then fit a cross-sectional model of estimated December 19 For those households who reported term insurance we probabilistically terminated it each year, based on the declining incidence reported by age in the SCF. 20 The date of the SCF interview is not available in the public data file, so it is not possible to deal with age on a more granular basis. More relevant for our purpose is that the SCF does not cover individuals who are in nursing homes. These are the wealthy individuals most likely to die in the upcoming year and likely represent a significant portion of the actual U.S. estates. However, time in the nursing home is likely to be short. Thus, though the 2007 SCF frame may undercount 2007 wealthy deaths, it should do a much better job in 2008 or later, as these people are less likely to be in nursing homes at the time of the survey.
31, 2007 log-wealth as a function of age controlling for marital status, education, race, income, employment status, pension, and number of children for each sample. For the single and widowed samples, additional controls are made for sex; for the widowed sample, we add a control for the number of years since the death of the spouse. Age and demographic coefficients from these regressions are used to predict the changes in log-wealth. Note that we deliberately leave out control variables related to age such as health from this regression, so that the coefficients on age come closer to total time derivatives. As aforementioned, we allow these coefficients to differ between the older wealthy sample and all other households. Estimating the effect of marital status changes on wealth presents a particular problem, since the cross-sectional nature of the data permits no direct measures of marital status changes. It was decided with some reluctance, therefore, to permit only the marital status change of married to widow in the forecasting model. In other words, we do not allow for married couples to divorce or for single persons to (re)marry. However, we do allow the time derivatives for widows to depend upon the length of time since widowhood. Estimates of the log-wealth regressions are presented in Table 2 .
The key coefficients are those for age. Since age is measured as a linear spline, note that age effects must be summed. The age effect is used as an estimate of the expected wealth change in period t. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show estimates for households not in the older wealthy sample. Columns (2), (4), and (6) show estimates for the interaction terms. In other words, the sum of Columns (1) and (2) gives the estimate for the older wealthy sample. Using December 31, 2008 wealth as a starting point (t = 1), future household log wealth is estimated by adding successive estimated age effects. In each future year, log-wealth is converted to dollar wealth as
where the change in wealth depends on the factors cited above.
Perforce, our wealth-change forecasts are real forecasts since all dollar data in the regressions are measured in 2008 dollars. Since estate tax schedules are denominated in nominal dollars, we have to convert real wealth into nominal wealth. To accomplish this we use the 10-year year-by-year inflation estimates employed by CBO. These estimates are also used in representing the current estate tax law, as the exemption amount is indexed for inflation. Forecasting death also presents challenges. We started with the U.S. Bureau of the Census male and female single-year age-specific survival probabilities forecasted for the year 2005 (middle series). The advantage of this series is that it forecasts future declines in mortality and adjusts for race. On the other hand, it takes no account of the known fact that mortality rates are lower for wealthier individuals. To adjust for this fact we obtained mortality tables used by insurance actuaries for wealthy annuity products (Johansen, 1995) . Unfortunately this series makes no adjustment for race and declines in future mortality. Both mortality series, however, contain estimates of year 2000 mortality by age and sex. We used both series to estimate male and female deaths in year 2000 (assuming it was measured as of December 31, 1999). 
Children ( (6), refer to the difference between the base and older wealthy sample (see Table 1 ). Standard errors are computed using repeated imputation inference technique (RII) (see Montalto and Sung (1996) ). The number of observations reported is an approximated average of the number of observations in each of the five survey implicates. Average adjusted R 2 is the average over the 5 regressions.
The difference in the two estimates was used to adjust the Census mortality figures by a single proportionality factor for all years by gender. These mortality estimates were used for all of our analysis. 21 For each year, the number of estimated deaths represented by a decedent household was computed as the sample weight multiplied by the probability of death. For a married couple, the deaths of the spouses were assumed to be independent, so that the probability of both dying in the same year was the product of the individual death probabilities. Although death surely takes place at a more uniform pace, we assumed for the purposes of simplicity that all deaths in a given year take place on December 31 after whatever annual wealth change forecast for that household had taken place.
The final step in the analysis is the estimation of year-by-year estates, bequests, unrealized capital gains in estates, and estate taxes. Rules regarding four issues needed to be specified: (1) rules governing the portion of wealth lost to costs of death and other expenses; (2) rules regarding non-taxable bequests to charities and other entities; (3) for married couples at the death of the first spouse, rules governing the portion of household wealth (or estate) passed on (or bequeathed) to the surviving spouse, and (4) to determine unrealized capital gains in estates, rules governing changes in decedents' portfolio allocation. Once these rules are specified, computing taxable estates is a straightforward matter.
We address the specification of the first three rules for the estate tax scenarios by fitting linear apportionment models on data from estate tax filings from 2000 to 2010 disaggregated by sex, age, marital status, and size of gross estate. 22 These data are used to estimate the percent of estate that is taxable and the percent of estate bequeathed to the surviving spouse (for decedents married at time of death). The estimated percent of the estate that is taxable addresses the first two issues related to cost of death expenses and bequests to charities and other entities, while the estimated percent of the estate that is bequeathed to a spouse addresses the third issue related to the portion of the estate bequeathed to the surviving spouse. Table 3 shows the results from the apportionment regressions.
For regressions of the percent of the estate that is taxable (Column (1)), males, married couples, and those with larger estates are associated with a lower fraction of the estate that is taxable. However, older decedents tend to have a higher fraction of their estate that is taxable. In the regressions on the percent of the estate that is bequeathed to the spouse (Column (2)), males and those with larger estate are associated with a 21 It might be argued that the adjusted mortality tables should only have been used for the older wealthy portion of the sample and not for the entire population. However, our main concern was to accurately estimate the mortality of individuals who would leave estates large enough to be subject to a material tax under one of our scenarios. Mis-estimating the mortality of the non-tax paying portion of the population would not materially alter any of the results of the paper. Thus we took the conservative view of applying the adjusted mortality rates to the whole population, recognizing that we are probably under-estimated the death rate of non-wealthy individuals. 22 Special thanks go to Brian Raub and Joe Newcomb at SOI for providing the data used to estimate the linear apportionments.
larger fraction of the estate bequeathed to the spouse. Conversely, older decedents tend to bequeath a smaller fraction to their spouse.
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With no data to help determine changes in households' portfolio allocations, we assume that asset portfolios remain constant over time (e.g., the proportion of assets held as unrealized capital gains does not change). Consequently, we use the household's portfolio allocation on December 31, 2007 to estimate unrealized capital gains at death. Moreover, for the capital gains scenarios we also lack data to help us set rules for apportioning wealth at death when there is a surviving spouse. As a result we assume that wealth is split equally between the household head and the spouse, 24 and that no part of a decedent's net of tax portion of wealth is passed on to the surviving spouse.
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v. results
As aforementioned, in the first part of the analysis we apply an estate tax and a capital gains tax independently to the entire population over the projection period. This is done to compare directly the differential impact of these regimes on liabilities and net revenues. In the second part of the analysis, we compare the differential impact of these regimes only for the projected estate tax-paying population. This counterfactual allows us to see how the estate-tax-paying population would have fared given a tax on capital gains at the time of death.
a. estate versus capital gains taxation
We begin by examining the role of unrealized gains in decedents' gross estate over the next decade. Figure 1 shows the share of unrealized capital gains in gross estates at the time of death for those deceased between 2013 and 2023.
In our data, unrealized capital gains include unrealized gains on real estate, privately held businesses, and directly held stocks and mutual funds. 26 The figure reveals that the share of unrealized capital gains in the gross estate increases with the size of the gross estate, ranging from about 6 percent of the smallest estates to 46 percent for gross estates over $50 million. Importantly, for all estates valued at $2 million or more, at least one-quarter of assets are held as unrealized capital gains (e.g., capital income that has not yet been subject to tax). 24 A casual look at the estate tax filings from 2000 to 2010 suggests that this might be the case. 25 These are admittedly simplistic assumptions necessitated by a lack of data. There are several reasons, however, why it is unlikely that they would significantly affect the qualitative results in the paper. First, our forecasts only extend to 10 years, which bounds the amount of portfolio balancing that is likely to take place among the estate-tax-paying population. Further, our emphasis is on a comparison between the current estate tax and a capital gains tax alternative. In this case, forecast errors in the wealth subject to the estate tax and taxable capital gains for individual taxpayers are likely to be highly correlated, thus bounding the difference; that is, individuals with higher wealth than predicted would also be likely to have a higher portion of their wealth in unrealized gains than predicted. Lastly, we ignore the possibility that some decedents might have negative net worth at death and thus their estates would be unable to pay any capital gains taxes that are due. The number of such cases should be very small. 26 Unrealized capital gains in account-type pension plans or IRA/Keoghs are not included in our measure of unrealized capital gains as the SCF does not collect this information. Also, withdrawals from these accounts are taxed at ordinary income tax rates. Account-type pensions and IRA/Keoghs are included in our measure of the gross estate. Figure 2 shows the projected revenue from the estate tax and two capital gains tax scenarios over 2013-2023. For the estate tax, the current law generates revenue of about $438 billion over the period, with one-third of the total revenue generated in the last two years of the projection. The increase in revenue in the last few years of the projections is a function of the rate of wealth accumulation outstripping the increase in the inflation-adjusted exemption amount. In contrast, the relatively flatter slope for the capital gains revenue trajectory is due to the single tax rate for capital gains and our assumption that fixes the share of capital gains in wealth to the share initially observed for the household. For the capital gains tax, the no capital gains allowance scenario generates about 50 percent more revenue ($694 billion) than the current estate tax law, while the capital gains allowance scenario only generates about $249 billion over the period. The sizable decrease in revenue in the capital gains allowance scenario is driven by the exemption for unrealized gains. Table 4 presents results for the incidence of the estate and capital gains tax across the three scenarios and by various household demographic characteristics.
Although the projection period for the results is 2013-2023, the demographic characteristics are defined as of 2007, not at the time of death. As shown in the first column, slightly more than 19 percent of individuals are predicted to die over the 10-year period of the projections.
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As shown in the second column, under the current tax law estate tax scenario, about three-fourths of a percent of the deceased pay some estate tax, with this fraction increasing with wealth and income. Not surprisingly, the top wealth and income groups are the Notes: Model results are generated using the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The capital gains allowance (CGA) given by the IRS in 2010 is $1.3 million with an additional $3 million for a surviving spouse. A small non-farm business is defined as a non-farm business with 25 or fewer employees. All numbers expressed as a percent, except as noted.
most likely to face the estate tax, with incidence rates of 24 and 17 percent. Due to the large exemption in the current estate tax, almost no households with wealth or income below the 90 th percentile face the estate tax. For the next-to-highest wealth and income groups, incidence is about twice as large for the income group, a reminder that many households with modest income have sizable wealth.
Slightly more than 5 percent of owners of large non-farm businesses paid estate tax, with about only 1 percent of owners of farm businesses subject to taxation. In comparison, about twice as many small non-farm business owners are subject to the estate tax. Incidence of the estate tax is higher for older age groups and for whites. Across education groups, the incidence is highest for college graduates, but surprisingly the incidence is higher for households without a high school diploma than for those with a high school diploma or with some college education. However, further examination of the data reveals this result is driven by the small number of households in this group (10 percent of the overall sample) and their relatively old age and fraction deceased compared to other education groups.
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The third and fourth columns of Table 4 reveal how different the incidence of the tax is under the two capital gains tax scenarios. Under the capital gains allowance proposal, which includes a $4.3 million exemption on unrealized gains, slightly less than 1 percent of households that die over the 10-year period would pay tax on unrealized capital gains. The overall incidence rate is slightly higher than under the current estate tax law, but the incidence rate increases substantially for certain groups. The share of households in the top wealth and income groups subject to the capital gains tax is about 30 to 40 percent higher than under the estate tax, but for farm business owners and large non-farm business owners the share subject to the capital gains tax is at least twice the share as under the estate tax. This result is driven by the large share of unrealized capital gains in the portfolios of business owners.
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As shown in the last column of Table 4 , the no capital gains allowance scenario presents a drastically different picture. Due to the lack of any exemption level, the incidence of the tax among deceased households increases significantly to about 37 percent. Among the top wealth and income groups and all types of business owners the share subject to the capital gains tax is at least 80 percent, with incidence rates over 95 percent for the top wealth group and farm business owners. Removing the capital gains allowance makes this scenario a very wide ranging tax; the lowest incidence rates of about 11 and 18 percent are for households with no high school diploma and minority households. Table 5 shows how the burden of the estate and capital gains tax liability changes under the different scenarios. Under the current estate tax law scenario, the mean tax liability is $2.9 million. In contrast, the mean tax liability under the capital gains allowance scenario is less than one-half that figure at $1.3 million and decreases to about $93,000 under the no capital gains allowance scenario. We now examine how tax liabilities change under the three scenarios across demographic groups.
The top wealth group accounts for about 83 percent of the tax liability under the current estate tax, and that share increases to over 91 percent under the capital gains allowance scenario. 30 The increased concentration is due to the capital gains tax allowance (exemption) applying only to unrealized capital gains. The estate tax exemption, on the other hand, is for the gross estate, which includes unrealized capital gains and other assets. Under the no capital gains allowance scenario, the share of tax liability accounted for the by top wealth group drops to about 58 percent, reflecting the much wider tax base. Mean tax liability for the top wealth group is $4.5 million under the current estate tax, but falls to $2.1 million under the capital gains allowance scenario and to $1.2 million under the no capital gains allowance scenario.
For the income groups, tax liability is much less concentrated than by wealth group under all of the scenarios, with the top income group accounting for a maximum of about 65 percent of the tax liability under the capital gains allowance scenario. As with the top wealth group, mean tax liability for the top income group decreases substantially when moving from the current estate tax to either capital gains tax scenario. Under the current estate tax law the lowest income group has a higher mean tax liability than the middle income group, a result that reveals the less than perfect correlation between income and wealth. Clearly, households in this group have large holdings of assets that generate minimal or zero income flows. This result is similar to results found in Johnson, Moore, and Schreiber (2011) , which show that income in the years prior to death is not a strong predictor of end-of-life wealth for estate tax filers with more than $20 million in gross assets.
The effects of the three scenarios are similar across the different types of business owners. For farm business owners, mean tax liability is highest under the current estate tax law, but the share of tax liability is highest under the no capital gains allowance proposal. Similar results hold for the small non-farm business owners in terms of mean tax liability, but the share of tax liability is highest under the current estate tax.
31 Large non-farm business owners have the highest mean tax liability of any group under the current estate tax and capital gains allowance scenario, but the share of tax liability accounted for by this group is higher under the capital gains scenarios, reflecting the large share of unrealized gains in their gross estate.
For other demographic characteristics, such as age, race, education, and marital status, the differences in mean tax liability between the estate tax scenarios and the capital gains tax proposals are more pronounced than differences in the distribution of tax liability. All groups have higher mean tax liability under the current estate tax law and the capital gains allowance scenario, which reflects the narrow incidence of the tax under these two scenarios.
Overall, imposing a capital gains tax at death without an allowance would generate more revenue than the current estate tax. A capital gains tax with an allowance would generate the least amount of revenue of the three scenarios. These results show that taxing capital gains at death can raise substantial revenue, but only if the tax is imposed on a much greater proportion of deceased households. Although adopting the capital gains tax would allay concerns over double taxation, it would require a fundamental shift in the idea that taxing wealth at death is a method for limiting intergenerational transfer of wealth for the highest wealth households.
B. comparison for households with estate tax liability
In this section we compare the estate tax and capital gains tax alternatives only for the subset of deceased households subject to the estate tax. This comparison is meant to analyze the impact of the change on households likely to be subject to some estate tax. In other words, we ask: how would households currently subject to an estate tax fare under a capital gains tax at death? As shown in Figure 1 , unrealized capital gains are an important component of the portfolios of households subject to the estate tax. The fraction of unrealized gains in the gross estate increases with the size of the gross estate, with the share ranging from 29 percent of the smallest estates to 45 percent of gross estates with a value over $50 million. Table 6 presents a comparison of how switching from the current estate tax law to either of the capital gains tax alternatives would affect households projected to have estate tax liability.
The first panel of the table reproduces results from Table 5 for mean tax liability and share of total tax liability under the current estate tax law scenario. The second panel of Table 6 shows that under the capital gains allowance proposal, about 71 percent of households facing the estate tax would pay capital gains tax. However, the mean tax paid declines by 38 percent from $2.9 million to $2.1 million, reflecting the lower tax rate under the capital gains scenario, the potential $4.3 million exemption, and the assumption that only unrealized gains are subject to the tax.
The second panel of Table 6 shows the incidence of the capital gains tax under the capital gains allowance scenario varies across demographic groups within the estate-taxliability population. Incidence rates are over 90 percent for farm business owners and large non-farm business owners, and above 75 percent for the top wealth and income groups, households with at least some college education, small non-farm business owners, and non-married males. The high incidence rate among the top wealth group and business owners is expected, as these groups are more likely to have unrealized capital gains in businesses. The capital gains tax liability is more concentrated than the estate tax liability, with the top wealth group accounting for about 90 percent of 
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Married the tax liability, compared to about 84 percent under the estate tax. Large non-farm business owners and the top income group also account for a larger share of the tax liability under the capital gains tax. Given the lower capital gains tax rate, mean tax liability under the capital gains tax falls for almost all demographic groups, except for households in the youngest age group. The final panel of Table 6 applies the no capital gains allowance scenario to households that paid the estate tax under the current estate tax law. Removing the capital gains allowance increases the share of estate tax households subject to the capital gains tax to over 97 percent. However, the mean capital gains tax liability is now about 50 percent lower than the mean estate tax liability and about 10 percent lower than under the capital gains allowance proposal. Across demographic groups, the incidence is at least 90 percent for almost all groups, with farm business owners, large non-farm business owners, and the top wealth and income groups having incidence rates near 100 percent. The mean capital gains tax liability under the no capital gains allowance proposal is less than the mean estate tax liability for all demographic groups except for the youngest households. The concentration of the tax liability under the no capital gains allowance scenario is similar to the estate tax for most demographic groups, but increases somewhat for the top wealth and income groups, large non-farm business owners, and married households.
The comparison of mean tax liability is less clear across the two capital gains tax scenarios. For the top wealth and income groups, mean tax liability is slightly lower under the no capital gains allowance scenario, but mean tax liability for farm business and small non-farm business owners is somewhat higher under the no capital gains allowance proposal. For the other demographic groups that experienced large changes in the mean tax liability, these changes appear to be driven by large changes in the fraction of deceased estate tax households subject to the capital gains tax under the two proposals.
Overall, Table 6 shows that almost all households subject to the estate tax would be subject to the capital gains tax under the no capital gains allowance proposal, but mean tax liability would be considerably lower. Under the capital gains allowance proposal, about 29 percent of deceased households subject to the estate tax would have no tax liability. Switching to a capital gains tax would also increase the concentration of tax liability among the top wealth and income groups beyond the levels seen under the estate tax. However, even for those households subject to the capital gains tax, their mean tax liability would be less than under the estate tax.
vI. conclusIon
In this paper we have looked at how alternative policies for taxing wealth at death are likely to affect the distribution of the tax burden among U.S. households over the next decade. Specifically, we have calculated the importance of unrealized capital gains in prospective estates and compared a traditional estate tax with a tax on unrealized capital gains at death. For this purpose, we have constructed a model of household wealth accumulation using data from the SCF. Because our model estimates wealth accumulation at the household level, we have been able to investigate the heterogeneous impact of these alternative tax policies across different demographic categories.
Our estimates suggest that a large share of households subject to the estate tax would also be subject to an alternative tax on capital gains. This is because a substantial amount of unrealized capital gains in gross estates is concentrated in wealthy households. Nevertheless, as capital gains are taxed at a lower marginal rate, the tax liability for these households would be lower than under the estate tax. Overall, we find that revenues generated by alternative regimes may differ significantly and are sensitive to the exemption level. As a result, there are important trade-offs to consider when choosing a policy. Adopting a capital gains tax alternative would eliminate the "double taxation" feature of a traditional estate tax and alleviate the lock-in effect. However to raise a similar level of revenue as the current estate tax, it would have to cover a much larger portion of bequeathed estates. As compared to the current estate tax, this expansion would substantially alter the set of households facing taxes at the time of death.
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The authors have no financial arrangements that might give rise to conflicts of interest with respect to the research reported in this paper. Table A1 presents a comparison of the model predictions and actual filings (from SOI tables) for estate tax filings for 2010 and 2012. We omit 2011 filings (which were for tax year 2010) due to the ambiguity in the estate tax during 2010. The model predictions are pure out-of-sample predictions based upon the model described earlier in the paper. We compare the number of returns, taxable returns, and the net estate tax from the model predictions to actual data from the SOI tables. For 2010, the model predicts about one-third more taxable returns, and more than twice as many taxable returns in 2012. For 2010, the predicted net estate tax is about 25 percent larger than SOI figures, and for 2012 the model estimate is about 40 percent larger. In both years, the over-prediction of net estate tax is concentrated in estates valued at less than $10 million; the model predictions for net estate tax for estates over $10 million are very similar to the SOI amounts in 2010 and 2012. In both years, the model also predicts more than twice the number of gross returns filed when compared to the actual number of filings. One explanation for these discrepancies is that we assume all decedents with a gross estate above the exemption level (prior to any deductions) file a return even if no tax is owed, something that might not always happen in practice.
When estates are categorized by the size of the gross estate, the model over-predicts the number of taxable returns and slightly under-predicts net estate tax for gross estates of $20 million or more. One possible reason for the under-estimation is that the variates in the model cannot generate the growth in wealth that actually occurs among some high wealth households. Basically, there is too much variance in the wealth growth over time in these households that is difficult to model, even with a data set that contains households at the top of the distribution. In contrast, the model over-estimates both the number of taxable returns and net estate tax for gross estates valued between $5 million and $10 million. One possible reason for the over-prediction is a high fraction of estates with business assets in this group. Estate tax law allows for devaluation of closely held businesses under certain circumstances, but we make no such adjustments to our estimates for gross estates (see Raub (2008) for more details).
